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The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  analyse	  the	  Hospital	  de	  Cascais	  “Dr.	  José	  de	  
Almeida”,	   built	   under	   a	   Public	   and	   Private	   Partnerships’	   program,	   in	   order	   to	  
understand	   if	   the	   private	   partner	   will	   be	   responsible	   for	   the	   hospital’s	  
management	  until	   the	  end	  of	   the	  contract	  (in	  2018)	  or	   if	   it	  will	  step	  out	  due	  to	  
financial	  losses.	  
Such	  analysis	  will	  be	  done	  using	  a	  Real	  Options	  approach,	  through	  the	  use	  
of	  abandonment	  options.	  Two	  scenarios	  will	  be	  considered:	   in	   the	   first	  one	   the	  
operational	   costs	   will	   follow	   the	   same	   evolution	   as	   expected	   in	   the	   Base	   Case	  
(86,7%	   of	   the	   revenues).	   In	   the	   second	   scenario	   the	   operational	   costs	   will	   be	  
assumed	  to	  be	  95%	  of	  the	  revenues,	  to	  better	  reflect	  the	  past	  performance	  of	  the	  
hospital.	  Moreover,	  for	  each	  of	  these	  scenarios	  two	  discount	  rates	  will	  be	  used	  to	  
compute	  the	  Net	  Present	  Value:	  one	  is	  the	  discount	  rate	  used	  by	  the	  government	  
to	  assess	  the	  value	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  comparator	  (PSC):	  6,08%;	  the	  other	  is	  the	  
Weighted	  Average	  Cost	   of	  Capital	   (WACC),	  which	   changes	   every	  year	   to	  match	  
with	  the	  changing	  debt	  ratio.	  
The	   results	   show	   that	   in	   the	   first	   scenario	   the	   optimal	   decision	   is	   to	  
continue	   in	  the	  project	  and	  not	  do	  the	  step	  out,	  since	  the	  Real	  Options	  analysis	  
shows	  that	  the	  stepping	  out	  provides	  savings	  smaller	  than	  the	  profit	  they	  would	  
obtain	  from	  continuing.	  However,	  in	  the	  second	  scenario	  the	  optimal	  decision	  is	  
to	  abandon	  the	  project.	   It	   is	  also	  concluded	  that	  the	  DCF	  model	  underestimates	  
the	  value	  of	  the	  project	  by	  ignoring	  the	  flexibility	  HPP	  has	  to	  step	  out.	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1.	  Introduction	  
Nowadays	   governments	   are	   spending	   more	   and	   more	   on	   health,	   with	  
health	  spending	  growing	  faster	  than	  inflation	  due	  to	  ageing	  populations	  (Exhibit	  
1),	   higher	   incidence	   of	   chronic	   diseases,	   higher	   life	   expectancy	   (Exhibit	   2)	   and	  
lower	   infant	   mortality	   rates	   (Exhibit	   3).	   As	   a	   result,	   governments	   are	  
increasingly	   looking	   for	   new	   ways	   of	   achieving	   efficiency	   and	   innovation,	  
without	   having	   to	   increase	   the	   public	   expenditure	   (PWC,	   2010).	   PPPs	   in	   the	  
health	   sector	   emerge	   as	   an	   answer	   to	   this	   situation,	   with	   the	   government	  
partnering	  with	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  share	  the	  project’s	  risks,	  build	  on	  
both	   parties’	   different	   sets	   of	   expertise	   and	   consequently	   achieve	   higher	  
efficiency.	  
According	   to	   the	   definition,	   in	   a	   PPP	   the	   public	   and	   private	   party	  
cooperate	  and	  share	  the	  risks	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  production	  and	  delivery	  
of	  services	  that	  are	  usually	  considered	  as	  public,	   in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  common	  
goal	   (Pomeroy,	   1998;	   Navarro-­‐Espigares	   and	   Martín-­‐Segura,	   2011).	  
Consequently,	  it	  is	  recognized	  that	  a	  PPP	  is	  a	  “sustainable	  approach	  to	  improving	  
social	  infrastructure,	  enhancing	  the	  value	  of	  public	  assets	  and	  making	  better	  use	  
of	  taxpayer's	  money”	  (Li	  and	  Akintoye,	  2003)	  
PPPs	  have	  been	  used	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  and	  Portugal	  is	  no	  exception.	  The	  
first	  PPP	  contract	  dates	  from	  1995	  and	  aimed	  to	  build	  and	  operate	  the	  Vasco	  da	  
Gama	  bridge.	  At	  the	  moment,	  there	  are	  35	  PPPs	  in	  Portugal	  (including	  the	  ones	  
under	  construction),	  10	  of	  those	  being	  in	  the	  healthcare	  sector.	  Moreover,	  from	  
2008	   to	   2011,	   the	   annual	   public	   expenditure	   in	   PPPs	  more	   than	   tripled,	   going	  
from	  475	  millions	  to	  1.822,6	  million	  euros	  (Exhibit	  4).	  This	  number	  is	  expected	  
to	  grow	  to	  more	  than	  2.000	  million	  euros	  per	  year	  in	  the	  period	  between	  2015	  
and	  2018	  (Exhibit	  5)	  (Direcção-­‐Geral	  do	  Tesouro	  e	  Finanças,	  2012).	  
In	  Portugal,	  there	  are	  two	  different	  types	  of	  PPPs	  in	  the	  healthcare	  sector,	  
which	  came	  in	  two	  different	  waves.	  The	  first	  one	  includes	  “Hospital	  de	  Cascais	  Dr.	  
José	  de	  Almeida”,	  further	  referred	  to	  as	  “Hospital	  de	  Cascais”,	  and	  is	  characterized	  
by	   having	   two	   private	   parties:	   one	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   the	  
infrastructure	   and	   the	   other	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	  management	   (Exhibit	   6).	   In	  
the	  second	  wave,	  PPPs	  only	  include	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  infrastructure.	  
Hospital	   de	   Cascais	   was	   the	   first	   hospital	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   National	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Health	   Service	   to	   be	   concessioned	   and	   built	   as	   a	   PPP.	   The	   concession	   was	  
delivered	   to	   “TDHOSP	  –	  Gestão	  do	  Edifício	  Hospitalar,	  S.A”	   (Teixeira	  Duarte)	   for	  
the	  construction	  of	  the	  building	  and	  to	  “HPP	  Saúde	  –	  Parcerias	  Cascais,	  S.A.”	  (HPP	  
–	  Grupo	  Amil1)	  for	  the	  hospital’s	  management.	  	  
HPP	  Saúde	  is	  a	  reference	  group	  in	  the	  health	  sector	  in	  Portugal,	  with	  over	  
15	  years	  of	  experience.	  	  It	  works	  in	  an	  innovative	  way	  and	  is	  focused	  on	  offering	  
high	   quality	   of	   health	   care.	   They	   took	   over	   the	   management	   of	   the	   former	  
Hospital	  de	  Cascais	   in	   January	   2009,	   and	   the	   new	   hospital	   opened	   its	   doors	   in	  
February	  2010.	  The	  hospital	   serves	  more	   than	  170.000	  citizens	  and	  expects	   to	  
have,	   in	   2018,	   a	   maximum	   annual	   capacity	   of	   115.000	  medical	   appointments,	  
6.474	   surgeries	   and	   67.000	   hospitalizations	   (HPP	   Cascais,	   2013;	   HPP	   Saúde,	  
2013).	  
The	  purpose	  of	   this	   study	   is	   to	   evaluate	   the	  Hospital	  de	  Cascais	   through	  
the	  use	  of	  Real	  Options,	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  if	  HPP	  will	  remain	  responsible	  for	  the	  
hospital’s	  management	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  contract	  (in	  2018)	  or	  if	  it	  will	  step	  out	  
due	   to	   financial	   losses.	   During	   the	   valuation	   process,	   it	   will	   be	   performed	   a	  
Monte	  Carlo	  simulation	  in	  order	  to	  estimate	  the	  cash	  flows’	  volatility	  and	  to	  get	  
some	  insights	  regarding	  the	  financial	  viability	  of	  the	  hospital.	  
The	  paper	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  The	  next	  section	  presents	  a	  brief	  literature	  
review	  that	  introduces	  a	  PPP	  overview,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  diverse	  
valuation	   methods.	   It	   also	   describes	   how	   PPPs	   are	   applied	   to	   the	   healthcare	  
sector.	   Section	   3	   describes	   the	   methodology	   used	   to	   apply	   the	   Real	   Options	  
approach	  to	  this	  particular	  case,	  and	  presents	  the	  scenarios	  created	  and	  data	  and	  
assumptions	  used.	  In	  section	  4	  it	  is	  presented	  a	  brief	  contextualization	  of	  PPPs	  in	  
the	   Portuguese	   healthcare,	   followed	   by	   the	   application	   of	   the	   model	   and	   the	  
results	  in	  section	  5.	  Section	  6	  explains	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  study	  and	  the	  paper	  
finishes	  with	  sections	  7	  and	  8,	  which	  deal	  with	  the	  limitations	  and	  further	  work	  
that	  could	  be	  done.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  2012	  Caixa	  Geral	  de	  Depósitos	  sold	  HPP	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  group	  Amil.	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2.	  Literature	  Review	  
2.1	  Overview	  	  
For	   the	   past	   decades	   governments	   all	   around	   the	   world	   have	   been	  
reaching	   for	   the	   private	   sector	   to	   provide	   services	   that	   they	   used	   to	   provide	  
through	  public	  (traditional)	  procurement.	  This	  new	  way	  of	  procurement	  is	  called	  
Public-­‐Private	  Partnerships	  (PPP),	  and	  according	  to	  OECD	  (2008,	  p.	  17)	  it	  can	  be	  
defined	   as	   an	   “agreement	   between	   the	   government	   and	   one	   or	   more	   private	  
partners	  (which	  may	  include	  the	  operators	  and	  the	  financers)	  according	  to	  which	  
the	   private	   partners	   deliver	   the	   service	   in	   such	   a	   manner	   that	   the	   service	  
delivery	   objectives	   of	   the	   government	   are	   aligned	  with	   the	   profit	   objectives	   of	  
the	  private	  partners	  and	  where	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  alignment	  depends	  on	  a	  
sufficient	  transfer	  of	  risk	  to	  the	  private	  partners.”	  As	  a	  result	  of	  such	  agreement,	  
governments	  are	  able	  to	  provide	  services	  and	  to	   improve	  social	   infrastructures	  
without	  the	  need	  to	  immediately	  raise	  taxes	  or	  to	  borrow	  by	  using	  a	  long-­‐term,	  
sustainable	  approach	  that	  increases	  the	  value	  of	  public	  assets	  (Li	  and	  Akintoye,	  
2003;	  The	  World	  Bank,	  2005).	  	  
The	   main	   rationale	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   PPP	   project	   is	   to	   achieve	   Value	   for	  
Money	   (VFM),	   that	   is,	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   service	   provided	   by	   the	   private	   sector	   is	  
lower	   than	   if	   that	  same	  service	  was	  provided	  by	   the	  public	  sector	   (considering	  
the	   same	   level	   of	   quality	   of	   services,	   risk	   allocation,	   price	   and	   time	   frame)	  
(Grimsey	   and	   Lewis,	   2004).	   This	   occurs	   due	   to	   the	   intrinsic	   motivation	   the	  
private	   sector	   has	   to	   be	   efficient	   (OECD,	   2008),	   as	   well	   as	   due	   to	   the	   better	  
management	   skills,	   risk	  management	   expertise,	  more	   experience,	   better	   access	  
to	  technology	  and	  more	  innovative	  and	  creative	  approaches	  and	  design	  (Birnie,	  
1999;	  HM	  Treasury,	   2003b;	   Li	   and	  Akintoye,	   2003;	  Grimsey	   and	  Lewis,	   2004).	  
Furthermore,	   there	   is	   also	   evidence	   that	   PPP	   agreements	   reduce	   the	   cost	   (or	  
deliver	   higher	   quality	   for	   the	   same	   costs),	   because	   of	   the	   synergies	   and	  
economies	   of	   scale,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   time	   to	   implement	   a	   project,	   due	   to	   the	  
incentives	  the	  private	  party	  has	  to	  deliver	  the	  project	  on	  time	  (Birnie,	  1999).	  
One	   of	   the	  most	   important	   issues	   about	   PPP	   arrangements	   is	   regarding	  
the	   risk	   and	   its	   allocation.	   By	   engaging	   in	   a	   PPP	   the	   government	   is	   able	   to	  
transfer	  certain	  risks	  to	  the	  private	  party,	  and	  becomes	  the	  buyer	  of	  a	  risk-­‐free	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product,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   does	   not	   pay	   if	   the	   product	   does	   not	   match	   the	  
stipulated	   criteria	   (Grimsey	   and	   Lewis,	   2004).	   The	   basic	   principle	   is	   that	   risks	  
should	   be	   allocated	   to	   the	   party	   who	   is	   best	   able	   to	   manage	   them2	  (Li	   and	  
Akintoye,	  2003;	  Grimsey	  and	  Lewis,	  2004;	  Carbonara	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  The	  goal	  is	  not	  
to	   maximize,	   but	   to	   optimize	   risk	   transfer.	   Risks	   should	   be	   appropriately	  
identified,	   analysed,	   allocated	   and	   managed	   by	   the	   parties,	   on	   a	   project-­‐by-­‐
project	  basis,	   in	  order	  to	  achieve	  value	  for	  money	  and	  thus	  ensure	  PPP	  success	  
(Grimsey	  and	  Lewis,	  2004;	  Ng	  and	  Loosemore,	  2006;	  OECD,	  2008;	  Carbonara	  et	  
al.,	  2010).	  
	  
2.2	  PPPs	  in	  Healthcare	  Facilities	  
Nowadays,	   government	   spending	   on	   healthcare	   is	   growing	   at	   an	  
unsustainable	   speed,	   due	   to	   challenging	   demographic	   and	   epidemiological	  
trends.	   Additionally,	   with	   the	   present	   recession,	   governments	   are	   considering	  
other	   ways	   of	   improving	   and	   maintaining	   the	   healthcare	   service	   without	  
increasing	   their	   spending.	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   healthcare	   is	   considered	   as	  
governments’	   responsibility,	   the	   private	   sector	   is	   becoming	   more	   and	   more	   a	  
source	   of	   capital,	   expertise,	   efficiency	   and	   innovation.	   PPPs	   allow	   for	   the	  
government	  to	  harness	  the	  skills	  and	  capabilities	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  
achieve	  public	  sector	  goals	  (PwC	  Health	  Research	  Institute,	  2010).	  	  
Nonetheless,	   PPP	   projects	   in	   the	   health	   sector	   are	   different	   from	   the	  
typical	   infrastructure	   projects,	   like	   toll	   road	   projects.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   revenue	  
contribution	   is	   usually	   low	   (since	   users	   only	   pay	   a	   user	   charge),	   and	   thus	   it	  
demands	   a	   large	   and	   on	   going	   payment	   from	   the	   public	   party.	   Moreover,	   the	  
ongoing	   expenses	   of	   operating	   a	   hospital	   represent	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   costs,	  
while	  in	  a	  toll	  road	  project	  the	  initial	   investment	  accounts	  for	  the	  main	  cost.	  As	  
result,	  there	  must	  be	  money	  available	  to	  fund	  the	  project	  after	  the	  construction	  
(Stowell	  and	  Loening,	  2011)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  “To	  best	  manage	  risk	  means	  to	  manage	  it	  at	  least	  cost	  and	  thereby	  reduce	  the	  long-­‐term	  cost	  of	  
the	  project.	  If	  the	  cost	  of	  preventing	  an	  adverse	  occurrence	  is	  less	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  dealing	  with	  its	  
consequences,	  then	  risk	  should	  be	  allocated	  to	  the	  party	  best	  able	  to	  influence	  the	  probability	  of	  
occurrence.”	  (OECD,	  2008,	  p.	  49)	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PPPs	   in	   the	   health	   sector	   can	   be	   of	   different	   types,	   with	   distinctive	  
degrees	  of	  responsibility	  and	  risk	  for	  the	  different	  parties.	  Figure	  1	  presents	  the	  













Figure	   1:	   Key	   types	   of	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   in	   the	   health	   sector.	   (Source:	   Nikolic	   and	  
Maikisch,	  2006)	  
	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  focus	  in	  the	  Private	  Financing	  Initiatives,	  
more	   specifically	   in	   DBFO3	  projects.	   This	   type	   of	   projects	   is	   characterized	   by	  
long-­‐term	   contracts	   between	   the	   private	   and	   the	   public	   parties,	   where	   the	  
private	  party	  is	  responsible	  for	  designing,	  building,	  financing,	  and	  operating	  the	  
facilities	  (Espigares	  and	  Torres).	  In	  such	  scheme,	  the	  government	  is	  responsible	  
for	   reimbursing	   the	   private	   party	   for	   the	   capital	   costs	   and	   for	   the	   costs	   of	   the	  
services	  provided	  (Nikolic	  and	  Maikisch,	  2006).	  The	  private	  party	  is	  responsible	  
for	   guaranteeing	   that	   the	   facilities	   are	   the	   most	   modern,	   efficient	   and	   cost	  
effective	   (Espigares	   and	   Torres).	   Moreover,	   the	   contracts	   should	   include	  well-­‐
defined	  goals,	  clear	  division	  of	  roles	  and	  responsibilities,	  and	  risk	  allocation,	  as	  
the	   quality	   of	   the	   contract	   is	   of	   critical	   importance	   for	   the	   success	   of	   the	  
partnership	  (Nikolic	  and	  Maikisch,	  2006).	  	  
Doing	  a	  partnership	   in	   the	  health	   sector	   results	   in	  many	  benefits.	   It	  not	  
only	   allows	   for	   a	   reduction	   in	   the	   governments’	   spending	   and	   for	   a	   greater	  
efficiency,	  but	   it	  also	  results	   in	  better	  healthcare	  management	  and	  in	   leveraged	  
technical	   and	   management	   expertise	   and	   higher	   technology	   transfers.	   Such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Design-­‐Build-­‐Finance-­‐Operate.	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benefits	  result	  in	  quality	  improvements,	  valued	  by	  the	  community.	  Moreover,	  the	  
public	   party	   can	   ensure	  better	  performance	   and	   improved	  outputs	   by	   creating	  
payment	  and	  reward	  mechanisms	  (Nikolic	  and	  Maikisch,	  2006).	  
	  
2.3	  Traditional	  Valuation	  Methods	  used	  in	  PPPs	  
Traditionally,	   the	   economic	   viability	   of	   projects	   is	   analysed	   by	  methods	  
based	  on	  the	  Discounted	  Cash	  Flow	  analysis	  (DCF),	  using	  the	  Net	  Present	  Value	  
(NPV)	  (Cheah	  and	  Garvin,	  2009;	  Carbonara	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Using	  this	  approach,	  the	  
analyst	   looks	   at	   historical	   financial	   data	   and	   estimates	   future	   cash	   flows	   to	   be	  
generated,	   which	   are	   then	   discounted	   to	   present	   value	   with	   resort	   to	   an	  








	   In	   order	   to	   obtain	   the	  NPV	   of	   the	   project,	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   investment	   is	  
deducted	   from	   the	   NPV	   of	   the	   stream	   of	   future	   revenues	   that	   the	   project	  
produces	  (Yescombe,	  2007):	  







	   DCF	  valuations	  are	  popular	  due	  to	  the	  easiness	  of	  the	  calculations,	  but	  it	  is	  
important	   to	  pay	   attention	   to	   the	   choice	  of	   the	  discount	   rate	   and	   to	   the	   future	  
cash	   flows	   estimation.	   The	   choice	   of	   the	   discount	   rate	   is	   not	   an	   easy	   decision,	  
since	   it	   should	  be	   the	  expected	  rate	  of	   return,	  which	   is	  hard	   to	  measure	   in	   the	  
case	   of	   non-­‐traded	   assets	   (Garvin	   and	   Cheah,	   2004).	   The	   estimation	   of	   future	  
cash	   flows	   is	   also	   of	   crucial	   importance.	   Dotzler	   (2001)	   argues	   that	   the	   most	  
commonly	  used	   factors	  when	  valuation	  a	  healthcare	   facility	  are	  profit	  margins,	  
the	   current	   size	   and	   predicted	   growth,	   and	   the	   structure	   and	   experience	   of	   a	  
solid	   management	   team.	   According	   to	   Hitchner	   (2003)	   the	   most	   important	  
components	   are	   net	   patient	   revenue,	   operating	   expenses	   (salaries,	   wages,	   and	  
benefits,	  medical	  supply	  costs,	  occupancy	  costs,	  insurance,	  bad	  debt,	  general	  and	  
administrative),	   working	   capital	   requirements	   (between	   10	   and	   25	   percent	   of	  
net	  revenue)	  and	  capital	  expenditures.	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The	  NPV	  rule	  is	  the	  following:	  the	  project	  is	  accepted	  if	  the	  NPV	  is	  positive	  
and	  rejected	  otherwise.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  positive	  NPV	  means	  that	  the	  NPV	  of	  the	  
future	   revenues	   will	   be	   higher	   than	   the	   investment,	   and	   thus	   there	   is	   value	  
creation	  for	  the	  investor.	  
However,	   the	   NPV	   method	   is	   based	   on	   strong	   assumptions	   that	   barely	  
correspond	  to	  reality.	  First	  of	  all,	   the	  use	  of	  a	  single	  discount	  rate	  suggests	  that	  
the	  risks	  involved	  in	  the	  project	  are	  the	  same	  throughout	  its	  life.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  
reality,	  and	  especially	  for	  a	  PPP	  project,	  this	  does	  not	  happen	  (Yescombe,	  2007).	  
A	   PPP	   project	   is	   perceived	   as	  more	   risky	   due	   to	   its	   long	   duration	   (Cheah	   and	  
Garvin,	   2009).	   Moreover,	   such	   project	   is	   exposed	   to	   many	   different	   risks	   that	  
differ	   through	   the	   life	   of	   the	   project.	   For	   Kerzner	   (1989),	   Smith	   and	   Walter	  
(1990),	  Chapman	  and	  Ward	  (1997)	  and	  Thobani	   (1998)	   there	  are	  at	   least	  nine	  
categories	   of	   risk	   in	   a	   PPP:	   technical	   (engineering	   and	   design	   failures);	  
construction	   (faulty	   construction	   techniques	   and	   cost	   	  escalation	   and	  delays	   in	  
construction);	   operating	   (higher	   operating	   costs	   and	   maintenance	   	  costs);	  
revenue	   (traffic	   shortfall	   or	   failure	   to	  extract	   	  resources,	   the	  volatility	  of	  prices	  
and	   demand	   for	   products	   and	   services	   	  sold);	   financial	   (inadequate	   hedging	   of	  
revenue	  streams	  and	   	  financing	  costs);	   force	  majeure	   (war	  and	  other	  calamities	  
and	   acts	   of	   God);	   regulatory/political	   (planning	   changes,	   legal	   	  changes	   and	  
unsupportive	   government	   policies);	   environmental	   (adverse	   environmental	  
impacts	  and	  	  hazards);	  and	  project	  default.	  	  
Furthermore,	   the	   DCF	   method	   ignores	   the	   managerial	   flexibility	   in	   the	  
project	  management	  process	   (Trigeorgis,	  1999;	  Miller	  and	  Park,	  2002),	   since	   it	  
does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  opportunity	  of	  changing	  the	  project’s	  strategy	  in	  
response	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  market	  conditions	  (Tan,	  2007;	  Brandão	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  
The	  NPV	  method	  does	  not	  capture	  this	  managerial	   flexibility	  well,	   since	   it	  does	  
not	   allow	   the	   adjustment	   of	   decisions	   when	   circumstances	   change	   and	   new	  
information	   is	   available.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   NPV	  method	   undervalues	   the	   project	  
(Cheah	  and	  Garvin,	  2009).	  	  
Also,	   the	   investment	   decisions	   are	   seen	   as	   “now	   or	   never”	   type	   of	  
decisions,	   instead	  of	  decisions	  that	  can	  be	  delayed.	  The	  DCF	  method	  accepts	  or	  
rejects	   a	   project	   depending	   on	   the	  NPV,	   and	   thus	   it	   rejects	   the	  projects	  with	   a	  
negative	  NPV,	  not	  considering	  that	  in	  some	  time	  the	  project	  may	  create	  value	  for	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the	  company,	  and	  thus	  delaying	  it	  has	  value	  (Miller	  and	  Park,	  2002).	  
	   Taking	  into	  account	  the	  drawbacks	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  valuation	  of	  
PPP	  projects	  asks	  for	  more	  complex	  methods,	  such	  as	  the	  Real	  Options	  approach.	  
	  
2.4	  Real	  Options	  Approach	  
As	  presented	  before,	   the	   traditional	  methods	  of	   valuation	  only	   take	   into	  
account	  part	  of	  the	  value	  of	  a	  PPP	  project.	  As	  result,	  the	  options’	  theory	  arose	  in	  
order	  to	  better	  assess	  the	  value	  of	  the	  project	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  managerial	  
flexibility	   (Carbonara	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   Real	   options	   theory	   allows	   analysts	   to	  
overcome	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   traditional	   methods,	   allowing	   for	   better	  
decisions.	  	  
In	   the	   early	   70s	   important	   advances	   regarding	   the	   valuation	   of	   options	  
were	  made	   by	   Black	   and	   Scholes	   (1973)	   and	  Merton	   (1973),	   which	   led	   to	   an	  
increase	   of	   the	   research	   regarding	   the	   pricing	   and	   use	   of	   financial	   derivatives	  
(Miller	   and	   Park,	   2002).	   The	   success	   of	   the	   financial	   derivatives	   provided	   the	  
basis	   for	   the	   incorporation	  of	   the	  options’	  methodology	   for	   real-­‐life	   assets	   and	  
projects	  under	  uncertainty	   (Brandão	  et	   al.,	   2012),	   and	   the	   term	   “Real	  Options”	  
was	   first	  used	  by	  Myers	   in	  1977.	  By	  definition,	   an	  option	   is	   a	   right,	  but	  not	   an	  
obligation,	   to	   undertake	   a	   certain	   action	   when	   facing	   uncertainty	   (Cheah	   and	  
Garvin,	   2009;	   Krüger,	   2012).	   Applying	   the	   options	   framework	   to	   assets	   gives	  
decision-­‐makers	   the	  choice	   to	   invest,	  grow,	  or	  abandon	  a	  project	  depending	  on	  
the	  new	  information	  gathered	  (Miller	  and	  Park,	  2002).	  	  
The	   real	   options	   framework	   is	  particularly	   important	  when	  valuing	  PPP	  
projects,	  since	  they	  are	  based	  on	  incomplete	  contracts	  and	  have	  very	   long	  time	  
frames,	  making	  such	  projects	  more	  uncertain,	  and	  thus	  riskier.	  Myers	  (1987)	  and	  
Trigeorgis	   and	   Mason	   (1987)	   proposed	   that	   the	   use	   of	   option	   valuation	  
techniques	   is	   of	   particular	   importance	   for	   investments	   with	   substantial	  
operating	   or	   strategic	   options.	   Cheah	   (2004)	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	  
balancing	  risk	  and	  value	  in	  this	  type	  of	  projects,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  real	  option	  
approach	   could	   correctly	   value	   the	   flexibility	   necessary	   to	   implement	   these	  
projects.	  	  
It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   notice	   that	   the	   real	   options	   framework	   does	   not	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substitute	   the	   DCF	  method.	   According	   to	  Miller	   and	   Park	   (2002)	   and	   Lint	   and	  
Pennings	   (2001)	   the	   real	   options	   approach	   complements	   the	   DCF	   method.	   In	  
order	  to	  valuate	  a	  project	  using	  the	  real	  options	  approach,	  the	  analyst	  still	  needs	  
to	   use	   DCF	   tools	   to	   compute	   the	   necessary	   inputs,	   and	   only	   after	   apply	  more	  
complex	   techniques.	   The	   DCF	   should	   be	   used	   for	   unsophisticated	   projects,	  
without	  uncertainty,	  and	  in	  a	  steady	  environment,	  while	  real	  options	  should	  be	  
used	  in	  projects	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  that	  rely	  heavily	  in	  future	  
information.	  
The	   use	   of	   real	   options	   to	   value	   infrastructure	   investments	   and	   PPP	  
projects	   is	   becoming	   a	   booming	   field	   of	   research.	   Alonso-­‐Conde	   et	   al.	   (2007)	  
studied	   the	   Melbourne	   CityLink	   (an	   automated	   toll	   road	   project)	   contract	  
conditions	  and	  how	  these	  conditions	  can	  be	   treated	  as	  real	  options	  and	   impact	  
the	  incentive	  to	  invest.	  The	  authors	  analysed	  the	  option	  the	  private	  party	  has	  to	  
defer	  payments	  to	  the	  public	  party	  in	  case	  of	  low	  returns	  (a	  put	  option)	  and	  the	  
government’s	   option	   to	   cancel	   the	   concession	   (a	   call	   option).	   The	   authors	  
concluded	   that	   significant	   value	   is	   transferred	   to	   the	   private	   sector	   because	   of	  
the	   contractual	   terms.	   Cheah	   and	   Liu	   (2009)	   studied	   how	   a	   negotiation	   band	  
incorporating	  options	  can	  be	  constructed,	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  guarantee	  (to	  
guarantee	  a	  minimum	   level	  of	   revenue)	   to	  attract	  private	   interest,	  while	  at	   the	  
same	  time	  protecting	  itself	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  cap	  on	  the	  level	  of	  return	  of	  
the	  private	  party,	  using	  a	  wastewater	  treatment	  plant	  in	  Southern	  China	  as	  case	  
study.	   Krüger	   (2012)	   analysed	   the	   execution	   of	   expansion	   options	   in	   road	  
infrastructure	  in	  Sweden,	  and	  concluded	  that	  external	  congestion	  costs	  should	  be	  
assumed	  by	  the	  public	  party	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  an	  optimal	  outcome.	  Brandão	  et	  
al.	  (2012)	  used	  the	  real	  options	  approach	  to	  “analyse	  the	  government	  guarantees	  
provided	  in	  the	  contract	  on	  the	  value	  and	  risk	  of	  the	  project,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  cost	  
and	  the	  risk	  of	  these	  guarantees	  to	  the	  government”.	  Blank	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  modelled	  
a	  hypothetical	  toll	  road	  concession	  and	  analysed	  three	  real	  options:	  a	  minimum	  
traffic	  guarantee,	  a	  maximum	  traffic	  ceiling	  and	  an	  implicit	  option	  to	  abandon.	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3.	  Methodology	  and	  Data	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  evaluate	  Hospital	  de	  Cascais	  taking	  into	  account	  
the	  possibility	  that	  the	  private	  partner	  has	  to	  abandon	  the	  concession	  when	  the	  
new	   information	   received	   contains	   bad	   news.	   According	   to	   Hull	   (1997)	   an	  
abandonment	  option	  can	  be	  treated	  in	  finance	  as	  an	  American	  put	  option	  on	  the	  
project’s	  value.	  This	  kind	  of	  options	  increases	  the	  valuation	  of	  the	  project,	  since	  it	  
mitigates	   the	   impact	   of	   poor	   investment	   outcomes.	   Moreover,	   the	   analysis	   of	  
such	   options	   not	   only	   gives	   an	   estimate	   of	   the	   value	   of	   the	   option,	   but	   also	  
reveals	  when	  abandonment	  should	  be	  executed	  (Copeland	  and	  Antikarov,	  2001),	  
since	  the	  decision	  to	  step	  out	  of	  the	  project	  is	  optimal	  when	  the	  present	  value	  of	  
the	  remaining	  cash	  flows	  falls	  below	  the	  salvage	  value.	  
In	  general,	  the	  value	  of	  an	  option	  (financial	  or	  real)	  depends	  on	  a	  number	  
of	   variables.	   Some	   of	   these	   variables	   relate	   to	   the	   underlying	   asset	   and	   other	  
relate	  to	  the	  financial	  markets.	  Starting	  by	  the	  ones	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  underlying	  
asset,	   there	   are:	   	   (a)	   the	   value	   of	   the	   underlying	   asset,	   (b)	   the	   volatility	   in	   the	  
value	  of	   the	  underlying	  asset,	   and	   (c)	   the	  expected	  dividends	  on	   the	  asset.	  The	  
variables	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  financial	  markets	  are:	  (d)	  the	  strike/exercise	  price	  of	  
the	  option,	  (e)	  the	  time	  to	  maturity,	  and	  (f)	  the	  risk	  free	  rate.	  
Applying	  the	  theory	  to	  the	  present	  case	  study,	  (a)	  the	  underlying	  asset	  is	  
the	   project’s	   value,	   (c)	   the	   expected	   dividends	   on	   the	   asset	   are	   the	   dividends	  
distributed	  by	   the	  SPV	  to	   its	  shareholders,	   (d)	   the	  strike	  price	   in	  abandonment	  
options	  is	  the	  salvage	  value,	  which	  is	  the	  value	  at	  which	  the	  project	  could	  be	  sold	  
at	  any	  moment.	  In	  the	  situation	  depicted	  in	  this	  paper,	  the	  private	  party	  does	  not	  
receive	   any	   money	   from	   stepping	   out	   of	   the	   management	   and	   delivering	   the	  
hospital	   to	   the	   government.	   The	   salvage	   value	  will	   thus	   be	   assumed	   to	   be	   the	  
costs	  that	  HPP	  would	  have	  to	  face	  in	  case	  it	  stayed	  until	  the	  end.	  	  (e)	  The	  time	  to	  
maturity	   is	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   concession,	   in	   this	   case	   is	   5	   years,	   since	   the	  
contract	  has	  the	  duration	  of	  10	  years	  and	  it	  was	  signed	  in	  2008,	  and	  (f)	  the	  risk	  
free	  rate	  is	  the	  Portuguese	  sovereign	  10	  years	  bond	  rate.	  
Regarding	  the	  (b)	  volatility	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  hospital,	  there	  is	  no	  market	  
data	  about	   it,	   since	   this	   is	  a	  non-­‐traded	  asset	   in	   the	   financial	  market.	  As	  result,	  
this	   value	   has	   to	   be	   estimated.	   According	   to	   Copeland	   and	   Antikarov	   (2001),	  
Miller	  and	  Park	  (2007)	  and	  Damodaran	  (2011)	  there	  are	  three	  methods	  to	  assess	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the	  volatility	  of	  the	  cash	  flows	  of	  the	  project.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  look	  at	  historical	  data	  
of	  similar	  projects	   (twin	  security)	  and	  use	   that	  as	  an	  estimate.	  However,	   in	   the	  
case	  of	  a	  hospital	  built	  as	  a	  PPP	  project,	  there	  is	  no	  similar	  project	  that	  has	  been	  
valued	  so	  that	  we	  can	  use	  the	  historical	  data.	  The	  second	  method	  involves	  using	  
the	  volatility	  in	  firm	  value	  of	  firms	  involved	  in	  the	  same	  business	  as	  an	  estimate.	  
Nevertheless,	   a	   PPP	   project	   involves	   the	   government	   and	   a	   SPV	   created	  
specifically	   for	   the	  project,	   and	   thus	   this	  option	   is	  not	   valid.	  The	   last	   and	  most	  
viable	  solution	  is	  to	  do	  a	  Monte	  Carlo	  simulation	  of	  future	  project	  cash	  flows	  in	  
order	  to	  estimate	  the	  volatility	  across	  present	  values.	  	  
Figure	   2	   summarizes	   the	   information	   previously	   present,	   showing	   the	  
variables	  used	   in	  the	  options	  theory	  and	  the	  correspondent	   in	  the	  present	  case	  
study,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	  data.	  
	  
Theory	   Present	  Case	  Study	  
Value	  of	  the	  underlying	  asset	   Project’s	  value	  
Volatility	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  underlying	  
asset	  
Volatility	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  hospital	  
Expected	  dividends	  on	  the	  asset	   Dividends	  distributed	  by	   the	  SPV	  to	   its	  
shareholders	  
Strike/exercise	  price	  of	  the	  option	   Costs	  HPP	  won’t	  have	  to	   face	   in	  case	   it	  
steps	  out	  
Time	  to	  maturity	   Duration	  of	  the	  concession	  
Risk	  free	  rate	   Portuguese	   sovereign	   10	   years	   bond	  
rate	  
Figure	  2:	  Variables	  used	  in	  Options	  Theory.	  
	  
For	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity,	   the	   valuation	   will	   follow	   a	   discrete	   time	  
approach.	   Thus,	   it	  will	   be	   used	   the	   option-­‐pricing	   lattice	   approach	   to	   compute	  
the	  value	  of	  the	  hospital,	  since	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  reflect	  the	  value	  of	  abandoning	  a	  
project	  through	  the	  use	  of	  decision	  trees.	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3.1	  Methodology	  
	   The	   methodology	   followed	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   based	   on	   the	   framework	  
proposed	  by	  Brandão	  and	  Dyer	  (2005),	  which	  is	  in	  turn	  based	  on	  the	  framework	  
developed	   by	   Copeland	   and	   Antikarov	   (2001).	   The	   analysis	  will	   follow	   a	   four-­‐
step	  approach:	  
1. Contract	  analysis	  and	  risk	  allocation	  identification;	  	  
2. Estimation	   of	   the	   value	   of	   the	   central	   scenario	   –	   project	   without	  
flexibility;	  	  
3. Monte	  Carlo	  simulations	  for	  the	  computation	  of	  the	  volatility;	  	  
4. Valuation	  of	  the	  hospital	  using	  the	  lattice	  approach.	  	  
The	   first	   step	  will	   be	   to	   analyse	   the	   contract	   signed	   by	   the	   government	  
and	  HPP	  for	  the	  clinical	  management	  of	  the	  hospital.	  The	  main	  focus	  is	  to	  reveal	  
the	  determinants	   that	   led	   to	   the	   financial	   failure	   that	   the	  hospital	   is	  proving	   to	  
be.	   Following	   this	   initial	   qualitative	   analysis,	   I	   will	   follow	   the	   framework	  
proposed	   by	   Copeland	   and	   Antikarov	   (2001)	   and	   later	   developed	   by	   Brandão	  
and	  Dyer	  (2005)	  to	  value	  the	  hospital,	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  whether	  HPP	  will	  keep	  
on	  being	  the	  establishment	  managing	  body	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  contract	  or	  if	  they	  
will	   step	   out.	   The	   valuation	   will	   begin	   by	   estimating	   the	   value	   of	   the	   central	  
scenario,	  which	  is	  the	  value	  of	  the	  hospital	  without	  considering	  the	  flexibility	  of	  
the	  options,	  using	  the	  DCF	  approach.	  After	  that,	  Monte	  Carlo	  simulations	  will	  be	  
performed	  to	  assess	  the	  volatility	  of	  the	  project,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  value	  the	  
hospital	  using	  the	  binomial	  lattice	  approach	  in	  the	  last	  step	  of	  the	  valuation.	  	  
	  
3.2	  Assumptions	  
According	   to	   Copeland	   and	   Antikarov	   (2001)	   at	   least	   two	   basic	  
assumptions	  have	  to	  be	  done:	  
A.1.	  Market	  Asset	  Disclaimer	  assumption:	  
According	   to	   this	   assumption	   the	   present	   value	   of	   the	   project	   without	  
accounting	  for	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  options	  is	  perfectly	  correlated	  with	  itself	  and	  
thus	  it	  is	  the	  best	  unbiased	  estimate	  of	  the	  project’s	  market	  value.	  As	  result,	  the	  
project	   is	   the	   underlying	   asset	   of	   the	   replicating	   portfolio	   (Copeland	   and	  
Antikarov,	  2001;	  Miller	  and	  Park,	  2003;	  Brandão	  and	  Dyer,	  2005).	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A.2.	  The	  variations	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  project	  follow	  a	  random	  walk:	  
This	   assumption	   allows	   practitioners	   to	   combine	   any	   number	   of	  
uncertainties	   of	   the	   project	   into	   one	   single	   uncertainty.	   This	   uncertainty	   is	  
associated	  with	   the	   stochastic	   process	   of	   the	   project	   value,	   whose	   parameters	  
are	  obtained	  from	  a	  Monte	  Carlo	  simulation	  (Brandão	  and	  Dyer,	  2005).	  
	  
Some	   other	   assumptions	   also	   have	   to	   be	  made	   in	   order	   to	   simplify	   the	  
computations,	   but	   it	   is	   believed	   that	   no	   loss	   of	   generality	   comes	   from	   such	  
assumptions.	  
A.	  3.	  The	  necessary	  debt	  is	  contracted	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  concession:	  
According	  to	  this	  assumption,	  the	  debt	  ratio	  decreases	  over	  the	  life	  of	  the	  
concession	  until	  there	  is	  only	  equity,	  due	  to	  the	  debt	  amortization.	  This	  implies	  
that	   in	   each	   year	   there	   will	   be	   a	   different	   weighted	   average	   cost	   of	   capital	  
(WACC).	  
A.	  4.	  No	  dividends	  distribution:	  
The	  payout	   ratio	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   zero,	   given	   the	   finite	  maturity	   of	   the	  
concession.	  Moreover,	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  PPP	  arrangement	  makes	   the	  dividends	  
policy	   irrelevant	   to	   the	  valuation	  of	   the	  project.	  Nevertheless	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
mention	   that	   this	   irrelevancy	   is	  merely	   theoretical	   and	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	  
paper.	  In	  reality,	  the	  SPV	  has	  only	  this	  project	  and	  thus	  cannot	  reinvest	  in	  other	  
projects.	  This	  situation	  leads	  to	  dividends	  distribution,	  either	  during	  the	  10	  years	  
of	  the	  contract	  or	  only	  at	  the	  end	  of	  it,	  in	  2018.	  
	  
3.3	  Model	  
3.3.1	  Risk	  Allocation	  
As	   it	   was	   already	   mentioned	   in	   the	   literature	   review,	   the	   risk	   and	   its	  
allocation	  are	  of	  crucial	  importance	  in	  PPP	  arrangements.	  PPPs	  allow	  the	  public	  
party	   to	   transfer	   certain	   risks	   to	   the	   private	   in	   order	   to	   benefit	   of	   risk	  
management	  at	  a	  lower	  cost	  (OECD,	  2008).	  Risks	  can	  be	  allocated	  to	  the	  private	  
party,	   remain	   with	   the	   public	   or	   be	   shared	   between	   the	   parties.	   The	   choice	  
depends	  on	  which	  party	  is	  better	  able	  to	  manage	  the	  risk,	  and	  that	  means,	  which	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party	  is	  better	  able	  to	  manage	  the	  risk	  at	  a	  lower	  cost	  (Grimsey	  and	  Lewis,	  2004;	  
OECD,	  2008).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  notice	  that	  the	  private	  party	  accepts	  most	  of	  the	  
risks,	   as	   long	   as	   they	   are	   paid	   accordingly	   for	   taking	   them.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
government	  should	  think	  if	  it	  is	  worth	  to	  pay	  the	  premium	  asked	  by	  the	  private	  
or	   if	   it	   would	   be	   better	   to	   accept	   the	   risk.	   Also,	   there	   may	   exist	   situations	   in	  
which	   neither	   party	   is	   in	   a	   better	   situation	   to	   manage	   the	   risk.	   (Grimsey	   and	  
Lewis,	  2004).	  	  
According	  to	  Grimsey	  and	  Lewis	  (2004)	  there	  are	  three	  aspects	  that	  ought	  
to	   govern	   the	   allocation	   of	   risk:	   (1)	   “specified	   service	   obligations”;	   (2)	   “the	  
payment/pricing	   structure”;	   and	   (3)	   “express	   contractual	   provisions	   adjusting	  
the	  risk	  allocation	  implicit	  in	  the	  	  basic	  structure”.	  Loosemore,	  Raftery,	  Reilly	  and	  
Higgon	   (2006)	  define	  a	   series	  of	   rules	   to	   follow	   in	  order	   to	  achieve	  an	  optimal	  
distribution.	   These	   rules	   are	   the	   following:	   “A	   risk	   should	   only	   be	   given	   to	  
someone	  who:	  has	  been	  made	   fully	   aware	  of	   the	   risks	   they	  are	   taking;	  has	   the	  
greatest	   capacity	   (expertise	   and	   authority)	   to	   manage	   the	   risk	   effectively	   and	  
efficiently	   (and	   thus	   charge	   the	   lowest	   risk	   premium);	   has	   the	   capability	   and	  
resources	   to	   cope	  with	   the	   risk	  eventuating;	  has	   the	  necessary	   risk	  appetite	   to	  
want	   to	   take	   the	   risk;	   has	   been	   given	   the	   chance	   to	   charge	   an	   appropriate	  
premium	  for	  taking	  it.”	  
	  
3.3.2	  The	  Central	  Scenario	  
The	   first	   step	   in	   the	   valuation	   is	   to	   estimate	   the	   value	   of	   the	   central	  
scenario.	   The	   central	   scenario	   represents	   the	   project	   without	   including	   the	  
impact	  of	  the	  real	  options	  that	  may	  exist	  due	  to	  managerial	  flexibility.	  The	  value	  
of	   the	   central	   scenario	  will	   be	   computed	   using	   the	   NPV	   approach,	   and	   can	   be	  
expressed	  by	  the	  formula:	  
(3)	   𝑽𝟎 =
𝑭𝑪𝑭𝑭𝒕





where	  FCFFt	   is	   the	  Free	  Cash	   flow	  to	   the	  Firm	  in	  period	  t	  and	  r	   is	   the	  discount	  
rate.	  The	  Free	  Cash	  -­‐Flow	  to	  the	  Firm	  is	  calculated	  the	  following	  way:	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(4)	  
𝑭𝑪𝑭𝑭𝒕   =   𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍  𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉  𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒕 ±   ∆  𝑾𝑪𝒕
−   𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑬𝑿𝒕,	  
	  
where	   Operational	   Cash	   Flow	   =	   EBIT	  -­‐	   Taxes	   on	   EBIT	  +	   Amortization	   +	  
provisions	  (Δ)	  –	  all	  non-­‐cash	  charges;	  ∆	  WC	  is	  the	  investment/disinvestment	  on	  
Working	  Capital;	  and	  CAPEX	  is	  the	  Capital	  Expenditures	  of	  the	  PPP,	  all	  for	  period	  
t.	  	  
	   The	   discount	   rate	   usually	   used	   is	   the	  Weighted	   Average	   Cost	   of	   Capital	  
(WACC)	  but	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  use	  both	  the	  WACC	  and	  the	  one	  
used	   by	   the	   government	   to	   assess	   the	   value	   of	   the	   public	   sector	   comparator	  
(PSC4),	  which	  is	  close	  to	  6%.	  The	  WACC	  will	  be	  computed	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  




𝑽 × 𝟏− 𝒕 	  
	  
	  
The	  Net	  Present	  Value	  of	  the	  hospital	  is	  thus	  given	  by:	  
(6)	   𝑵𝑷𝑽   =   𝑽𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟑  –   𝑰,	   	  
where	  I	  stands	  for	  the	  investment	  undertaken	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  concession	  
plus	  the	  accumulated	  results	  from	  2008	  until	  2012.	  
  
3.3.3	  Monte	  Carlo	  Simulation	  
The	   Monte	   Carlo	   simulation	   will	   be	   done	   to	   combine	   all	   sources	   of	  
uncertainties	   into	   one	   single	   distribution,	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   the	   project’s	  
volatility.	  	  
It	   will	   be	   done	   a	   simulation	   of	   the	   Arithmetic	   Brownian	  Motion	   (ABM)	  
random	  walk	  process	  of	  the	  returns:	  	  
(7)	   𝒅  𝒍𝒏  𝑽   =   𝒗𝒅𝒕  +   𝝈𝒅𝒛,	   	  
where	  𝑑𝑧   =   𝜀 𝑑𝑡	  is	  the	  standard	  Wiener	  process.	  	  
The	   first	   step	   is	   to	   simulate	   the	   stochastic	   processes	   of	   the	   relevant	  
project	  variables	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  uncertainties	  affecting	  
them.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  project	  cash	  flows	  become	  stochastic.	  According	  to	  Brandão	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  “The	  PSC	  estimates	  the	  hypothetical	  risk-­‐adjusted	  cost	  if	  a	  project	  were	  to	  be	  financed,	  owned	  
and	  implemented	  by	  government.”	  (The	  World	  Bank,	  2011)	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and	  Dyer	  (2005):	  “each	  repetition	  of	  the	  Monte	  Carlo	  simulation	  provides	  a	  new	  
set	  of	  future	  cash	  flows,	  which	  are	  used	  to	  compute	  a	  new	  project	  value	  𝑉!,	  using	  
the	  NPV	   formula	   above.	   A	   sample	   of	   the	   random	  variable	  𝑣	  can	   be	   determined	  
from:	  	  





where	  𝐸 𝑣 = 𝑣	  and	  V0	  is	  the	  PV	  of	  the	  Central	  Scenario.	  
A	  full	  run	  of	  the	  simulation	  provides	  a	  sample	  set	  of	  the	  random	  variable	  𝑣	  
from	  which	  the	  project	  volatility	  is	  then	  computed.”	  
	  
3.3.4	  Binomial	  Lattice	  
By	  now	  we	  already	  have	  the	  initial	  project	  value	  V,	  the	  discount	  rate	  r,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  volatility	  σ.	  The	  value	  of	  the	  project	  can	  be	  modelled	  as	  a	  Geometric	  
Brownian	  Motion	  (GBM)	  stochastic	  process,	  and	  it	  is	  given	  by:	  
(9)	   𝒅  𝑽   =   𝝁  𝑽  𝒅𝒕  +   𝝈  𝑽  𝒅𝒛,	   	  
where	  μ	  is	  the	  expected	  return	  on	  the	  project,	  σ	  is	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  
return,	   and	  dz	   is	   a	  Wiener	  process.	  On	  a	   small	  discrete	   time	   interval,	  Δt:  ΔVV   =
  𝝁  𝜟𝒕  +   𝝈  𝜟𝒛	  
Using	  the	  discrete	  binomial	  lattice	  proposed	  by	  Cox,	  Ross	  and	  Rubinstein	  
(1979),	   the	   first	   step	   is	   to	   determine	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   underlying	   asset,	  
starting	  with	  the	  PV	  of	  the	  Central	  Scenario.	  	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
estimate	  the	  value	  of	  the	  project	  during	  its	  life,	  which	  is	  given	  by:	  
(10)	   𝑽𝒕,𝒊𝒖 = 𝑽𝒕!𝟏×𝒖𝒊×𝒅𝒕!𝒊	   	  
where	   Vt-­‐1	   is	   the	   value	   of	   the	   project	   in	   the	   previous	   period;	   	  𝑢 = 𝑒! ∆!	  and	  
𝑑 = 𝑒!! ∆! ,	  which	  measure	  the	  size	  of	  the	  up	  and	  down	  movements	  in	  the	  lattice;	  
and	  i	  denotes	  the	  number	  of	  periods	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  project	  increased.	  	  
The	  next	  step	  is	  to	  construct	  the	  American	  put	  option	  tree,	  starting	  from	  
the	  end	  nodes	  and	  working	  backward	  through	  the	  tree.	  In	  the	  last	  node,	  the	  value	  
is	  obtained	  as:	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(11)	   𝑷𝒕 = 𝑴𝑨𝑿 𝑿− 𝑽𝒕;𝟎 ,	   	  
where	  X	   is	   the	  exercise	  price	  and	  Vt	   is	   the	  value	  of	   the	  underlying	  asset	   in	   the	  
correspondent	  node	  to	  Pt.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  nodes,	  the	  value	  is	  obtained	  as:	  
(12)	   𝑷𝒕 = 𝑴𝑨𝑿 𝑿− 𝑽𝒕;




where	  π	  =	   !!!! 	  -­‐	  d
u	  -­‐	  d
	  is	   the	   probability	   of	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   value	   of	   the	   project,	  
1− π = !! !!!!
!!!
	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  project,	  𝑃!!!! 	  
is	  the	  value	  of	  the	  American	  put	  option	  in	  the	  following	  period	  if	  it	  goes	  up,	  and	  
𝑃!!!! 	  is	   the	   value	   of	   the	   American	   put	   option	   in	   the	   following	   period	   if	   it	   goes	  
down.	  
The	  net	  present	  value	  of	   the	  project	  under	   the	  Real	  Options	  approach	   is	  
thus	  given	  by:	  
(13)	   𝑵𝑷𝑽   =   𝑽𝟎 + 𝑷𝟎  –   𝑰	   	  
	  
3.4	  Scenarios	  
For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  two	  main	  scenarios	  will	  be	  analysed.	  These	  
two	  scenarios	  will	  also	  comprise	  two	  sub-­‐scenarios,	  as	  explained	  below.	  
	  
3.4.1	  Scenario	  1	  
In	   the	   first	   scenario	   it	   will	   be	   considered	   for	   the	   Operational	   Costs	   the	  
same	  assumption	  used	  in	  the	  Base	  Case	  (when	  the	  public	  sector	  comparator	  was	  
calculated):	  operational	  costs	  are	  86,7%	  of	  revenues.	  Moreover,	  inside	  scenario	  1	  
two	   sub-­‐scenarios	   will	   be	   considered	   in	   the	   computation	   of	   the	   NPV	   of	   the	  
central	   scenario.	  The	   first	  will	  be	  built	  by	  using	   the	  discount	   rate	  of	   the	  public	  
sector	  to	  discount	  the	  cash	  flows,	  and	  the	  second	  using	  the	  WACC.	  
	  
3.4.2	  Scenario	  2	  
The	   second	   scenario	   is	   built	   because	   after	   analysing	   the	   past	   financial	  
performance	  of	  the	  hospital,	  it	  was	  realized	  that	  the	  Operational	  Costs	  were	  the	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main	   responsible	   for	   the	  bad	   results	   reported,	   as	   they	   represented	  on	   average	  
99%	  of	   the	   revenues.	   Taking	   into	   account	   this	   situation,	   I	   believed	   it	  was	   also	  
relevant	  to	  analyse	  if	  HPP	  will	  have	  the	  same	  decision	  considering	  a	  higher	  value	  
for	   the	   Operational	   Costs.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   second	   scenario	   I	   will	   consider	   the	  
Operational	  Costs	  to	  be	  95%	  of	  the	  revenues	  (the	  percentage	  is	  lowered	  since	  the	  
high	  value	  of	  99%	  may	  also	  be	  due	   to	   the	  early	  years).	  Also	   for	  scenario	  2,	   the	  
two	  sub-­‐scenarios	  will	  be	  considered	  for	  the	  computation	  of	  the	  NPV.	  
	  
3.5	  Data	  
The	  valuation	  of	  the	  hospital	  will	  be	  based	  both	  in	  the	  Base	  Case	  scenario	  
proposed	  by	  the	  winner	  bidder	  –	  HPP	  –	  and	  also	  on	  some	  assumptions,	   for	  the	  
data	   that	   was	   not	   available.	   The	   market	   data,	   such	   as	   the	   inputs	   for	   the	  
computation	  of	  the	  WACC,	  was	  obtained	  from	  Bloomberg.	  
The	   following	   table	   presents	   the	   data	   and	   the	   assumption	   on	   data	   used	  
and	  the	  correspondent	  source.	  
	  
Data	   Source	  
Revenues	   The	  revenues	  are	  available	  in	  the	  Base	  Case.	  
Operating	  expense	   The	   operating	   expense	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   a	  
percentage	  of	  the	  revenues.	  In	  the	  first	  scenario	  this	  
percentage	  is	  87,66%,	  which	  is	  the	  expected	  annual	  
OPEX	   divided	   by	   the	   expected	   annual	   operational	  
revenue.	   In	   the	   second	   scenario	   the	   operating	  
expense	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  95%	  of	  the	  revenues.	  
For	   both	   scenarios,	   each	   of	   the	   items	   of	   operating	  
expense	   is	   calculated	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   total	  
operating	  expense.	  
Depreciation	   The	  depreciation	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  at	  a	  constant	  rate,	  
as	   (Book	   Value	   of	   Tangibles	   2011	   +	   Book	   Value	   of	  
Intangibles	  2011	  	  +	   𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋!"#$!"#! )/(2018-­‐2012).	  
Debt	  Amortization	   It	  was	  assumed	  that	  the	  net	  income	  was	  first	  used	  to	  
pay	   CAPEX	   and	   what	   is	   left	   is	   used	   to	   repay	   long-­‐
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term	  debt.	  
Interests	   According	   to	   the	   Base	   Case,	   the	   two	   parties	  
contracted	   interest	   rate	   swaps	   in	   order	   to	   hedge	  
Euribor’s	  volatility,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  fixed	  interest	  
rate	  of	  5,06%.	  
Taxes	   The	  tax	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  25%.	  
CAPEX	   In	  the	  Base	  Case	  the	  initial	  CAPEX	  is	  23.096.000€.	  
From	  the	  real	  financial	  results	  by	  2011	  the	  CAPEX	  
was	  23.309.229€,	  so	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  from	  then	  
on	  there	  would	  be	  no	  CAPEX.	  
Investment	  in	  Net	  
Working	  Capital	  
In	   order	   to	   obtain	   the	   Investment	   in	   Net	   Working	  
Capital	   it	  was	  used	   the	  Days	  Sales	  Outstanding,	   the	  
Inventory	   Turnover	   and	   the	   Days	   Payables	  
Outstanding.	   These	   parameters	  were	   calculated	   for	  
the	   past	   data,	   computed	   an	   average	   and	   assumed	  
that	  from	  2012	  onwards	  they	  would	  be	  equal	  to	  the	  
average	  of	   the	  past	  years.	  With	   this	   it	  was	  possible	  
to	  obtain	  the	  value	  for	  the	  Inventories,	  the	  Accounts	  
Receivable	  and	  the	  Accounts	  Payable.	  
Discount	  Rate:	  PSC	   The	  discount	  rate	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  comparator	  
results	  of	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  inflation	  rate	  and	  the	  real	  
discount	  rate,	  both	  fixed	  in	  the	  order	  nr.	  13	  
208/2003	  (2nd	  series)	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  as	  
2%	  and	  4%,	  respectively.	  
Discount	  Rate:	  WACC	   For	  the	  cost	  of	  equity	  it	  was	  used	  market	  data	  and	  
the	  cost	  of	  debt	  is	  the	  swap	  contracted.	  
Figure	  3:	  Summary	  of	  the	  data	  and	  correspondent	  sources	  used.	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4.	  Contextualization	  
4.1	  Background	  to	  PPPs	  in	  Portuguese	  Healthcare	  Facilities	  
The	  provision	  and	  funding	  of	  healthcare	  in	  Portugal	  is	  primarily	  done	  by	  
the	  government.	  The	  National	  Health	  Service	  (Serviço	  Nacional	  de	  Saúde	  –	  SNS)	  
is	   the	   dominant	   establishment	   responsible	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   healthcare	   in	  
Portugal,	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  (Ministério	  da	  Saúde),	  in	  a	  
fair	  way	  and	  almost	  for	  free.	  	  
However,	   the	   public	   health	   spending	   is	   growing	   fast	   (Exhibit	   7),	   with	  
almost	   70%	   of	   the	   total	   expenditure	   in	   health	   being	   public	   (Exhibit	   8).	   At	   the	  
same	  time,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  develop	  the	  health	  infrastructures	  and	  to	  increase	  
the	   efficiency.	   This	   situation	   gave	   rise	   to	   the	   PPP	   program	   in	   the	   Portuguese	  
healthcare	  sector,	  since	  it	  would	  allow	  for	  the	  necessary	  reform	  without	  the	  need	  
to	   increase	   the	   government	   spending.	   The	   PPP	   program	   for	   the	   health	   sector	  
became	   possible	   through	   the	   approval	   of	   the	   decree	   law	   nr.	   185/2002,	   which	  
defined	  the	  principles	  and	  instruments	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  partnerships.	  
Such	  decree	  stated	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  partnerships	  was	  the	  lasting	  association	  of	  
the	  private	  and	  the	  public	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  mutual	  objectives.	  Moreover,	  
it	  also	  detailed	  that	  the	  partnership	  could	  comprise	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  following	  
activities:	  design,	  construction,	  financing,	  maintenance	  and	  operation.	  (Diário	  da	  
República,	   2002).	   Afterwards,	   more	   decrees	   were	   published	   (DL	   nr.	   86/2003	  
and	  DL	  nr.	  141/2006)	  with	   the	  objective	  of	   introducing	  some	  changes,	   such	  as	  
the	   general	   rules	   applicable	   to	   state	   intervention	   in	   PPPs,	   as	  well	   as	  measures	  
aiming	  at	  more	  risk	  and	  profit	  sharing	  between	  the	  parties	  (Diário	  da	  República,	  
2003;	  Diário	  da	  República,	  2006;	  Direcção-­‐Geral	  do	  Tesouro	  e	  Finanças,	  2013).	  	  
The	  first	  wave	  of	  PPPs	  is	  comprised	  by	  four	  hospitals:	  Hospital	  de	  Cascais,	  
Hospital	   de	   Braga,	   Hospital	   de	   Loures	   and	   Hospital	   de	   Vila	   Franca	   (Figure	   4).	  
Together,	   they	  are	  responsible	   for	  the	  provision	  of	  medical	  care	  to	  1,67	  million	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Figure	  4:	  First	  wave	  of	  PPPs	  in	  the	  healthcare	  sector.	  
	  
This	   first	   wave	   of	   PPPs	   includes	   the	   provision	   of	   the	   infrastructure,	   as	  
well	  as	  the	  clinical	  services	  (hospital	  management).	  As	  the	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  
clinical	   services	   are	   very	   different,	   two	   contracts	   were	   made.	   For	   the	  
infrastructure,	   the	   contract	   has	   the	   duration	   of	   30	   years,	   and	   the	   SPV	   (Special	  
Purpose	  Vehicle)	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  design,	  construction	  and	  maintenance	  of	  
the	  hospital	  building	  and	  fixed	  equipment.	  For	  the	  clinical	  services	  the	  duration	  
is	  10	  years	  and	  the	  SPV	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  clinical	  services,	  ancillary	  services	  
and	   medical	   equipment	   acquisition	   and	   replacement	   (Exhibit	   6).	   The	  
infrastructure	   SPV	   is	   paid	   based	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   the	   services	   contracted,	  
while	   the	   clinical	   SPV	   is	   paid	   based	   on	   clinical	   production	   by	   major	   lines	   of	  
clinical	   activity	   (emergency,	   inpatient,	  outpatient),	   according	   to	  a	   specific	  price	  
list,	   defined	   within	   the	   process	   tender.	   In	   both	   cases	   there	   are	   payment	  
deductions	  and	  penalties	  related	  to	  failure	  to	  deliver	  service	  and/or	  quality.	  For	  
the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  only	  the	  hospital	  management	  will	  be	  analysed.	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5.	  Applying	  the	  Model	  
5.1	  Identification	  of	  the	  Risks	  
As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  methodology	  section,	  the	  Monte	  Carlo	  Simulation	  will	  
be	  done	   to	   combine	   all	   sources	  of	  uncertainties	   into	  one	   single	  distribution,	   in	  
order	  to	  determine	  the	  project’s	  volatility.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  
to	  identify	  the	  main	  sources	  of	  uncertainty	  the	  project	  is	  exposed	  to.	  	  
As	   in	   this	   paper	   only	   the	   hospital’s	  management	   is	   being	   analysed,	   and	  
not	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   infrastructure,	   only	   the	   risks	   regarding	   to	   the	  
hospital’s	   management	   will	   be	   examined.	   Also,	   according	   to	   the	   Ministry	   of	  
Finance	   (2012)	   the	   risks	   associated	   with	   exploration	   activities	   under	   the	  
partnership	   agreement	   are	   the	  most	   important,	   having	   a	  weight	   of	   41%	  of	   the	  
total	  risks	  to	  which	  the	  project	  is	  exposed.	  
In	   terms	   of	   allocation,	   the	   risks	   can	   be	   allocated	   to	   the	   private	   party,	  
remain	  with	  the	  public	  or	  shared	  between	  the	  two	  parties.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Hospital	  
de	   Cascais	   the	   private	   sector	   is	   exposed	   to	   the	   operational	   risk,	   since	   it	   is	  
responsible	   for	   ensuring	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   healthcare	   service	   according	   to	  
the	   quantities	   agreed	   by	   the	   two	   parties	   in	   the	   contract.	   Moreover,	   it	   is	   also	  
responsible	  for	  maintaining	  the	  hospital	  adequately	  equipped	  and	  staffed	  to	  fulfil	  
its	   obligations.	   The	   private	   party	   is	   also	   exposed	   to	   the	   financial	   risk,	   as	   it	   is	  
responsible	   for	   obtaining	   the	   necessary	   funds	   for	   the	   development	   of	   all	   the	  
activities	   that	   comprise	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   contract.	   Nevertheless,	   as	   the	   private	  
party	   contracted	   interest	   rate	   swaps,	   they	   hedged	   against	   Euribor’s	   volatility.	  
Furthermore,	  as	  the	  private	  party	  is	  compensated	  for	  the	  production	  it	  bears	  the	  
demand	   risk,	   since	   it	   is	   not	   paid	   for	   the	   units	   not	   produced	   nor	   for	   the	  
production	  above	  the	  maximum	  cap	  defined	  in	  the	  contract.	  	  
For	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   paper	   only	   the	   demand	   risk	  will	   be	   considered.	  
The	   financial	   risk	  was	  mitigated	  by	   contracting	   interest	   rate	   swaps,	   and	  as	   the	  
operational	   expenses	  are	  assumed	   to	  be	  a	  percentage	  of	   the	   revenues,	   the	   real	  
source	  of	  the	  risk	  is	  the	  demand	  risk.	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5.1.1	  Revenues	  
For	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   paper,	   I	   will	   only	   focus	   on	   the	   remuneration	  
scheme	  of	  HPP	  Saúde,	  as	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  to	  determine	  when	  the	  private	  
party	  responsible	  for	  providing	  the	  medical	  services	  will	  step	  out	  due	  to	  the	  bad	  
results	  it	  has	  been	  reporting.	  	  
As	  already	  mentioned,	  the	  remuneration	  of	  the	  clinical	  SPV	  by	  the	  public	  
party	  depends	  on:	  the	  actual	  production	  of	  clinical	  services	  contracted	  annually	  
in	  accordance	  with	  the	  criteria	  for	  recovery	  and	  production	  limits	  set	  out	  in	  the	  
contract;	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   specific	   hospital	   services;	   on	   the	   adjustments	  
resulting	  from	  the	  prescription	  of	  drugs	  by	  doctors;	  and	  also	  on	  the	  penalties	  for	  
the	   occurrence	   of	   performance	   failures.	   The	   remuneration	   varies	   depending	   if	  
the	   actual	   production	   is	   within	   the	   limits	   of	   expected	   (contracted)	   production	  
(level	   1)	   or	   above	   (marginal	   production,	   level	   2),	   with	   a	   limit	   of	   10%.	   The	  
production	   above	   110%	   is	   not	   paid,	   except	  with	   regards	   to	   emergency	  where	  
there	   is	   not	   an	   upper	   limit	   to	   production	   (it	   is	   considered	   that	   this	   service	  
benefits	  the	  population,	  and	  thus	  the	  production	  in	  this	  area	  is	  not	  discouraged	  
by	  placing	  a	   cap	   in	   the	  expected	  production).	  The	   level	  of	  expected	  production	  
for	  a	  certain	  year	  is	  fixed	  in	  the	  end	  of	  the	  previous	  year,	  either	  by	  both	  parties	  
or,	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  agreement,	  only	  by	  the	  public	  party.	  It	  is	  determined	  based	  on	  
an	  estimate	  of	  the	  variables	  that	  are	  necessary,	  such	  as	  the	  production	  quantity	  
in	  inpatient	  and	  outpatient	  surgery,	  the	  number	  of	  visits	  to	  the	  emergency	  room	  
and	  the	  number	  of	  outpatient	  visits,	  among	  others.	  
The	  remuneration	  has	  also	  an	  innovative	  component	  that	  consists	   in	  the	  
rationalization	   of	   prescription	   medications,	   performed	   by	   comparison	   with	   a	  
group	   of	   reference	   public	   hospitals.	   This	   aims	   at	   avoiding	   the	   excessive	  
prescription	   of	   drugs,	   since	   it	   can	   imply	   deductions	   to	   remuneration	   if	   the	  
hospital	   prescribes	   more	   drugs	   than	   the	   reference	   group.	   However,	   such	  
mechanism	   may	   undermine	   the	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   the	   provision	   of	  
quality	   health	   care,	   since	   it	   since	   it	   could	   constrain	   the	   technical	   autonomy	   of	  
physicians.	  
	   The	   contract	   also	   states	   that	   the	   production	   relative	   to	   private	   practice	  
can	  only	  be	  of	  10%	  of	   the	   contracted	  production	   for	  a	   certain	  year	   in	  order	   to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  production	  for	  the	  National	  Health	  Service	  is	  not	  compromised.	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   Regarding	   the	   setting	   of	   prices	   and	   quality	   standards,	   the	   public	   party	  
chose	  a	  reference	  group	  of	  public	  hospitals	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  most	  efficient	  in	  
the	  public	  sector	  and	  with	  similar	  dimensions	  and	  complexity.	  From	  this	  group,	  
three	  hospitals	  with	  the	  lowest	  unitary	  costs	  in	  the	  two	  previous	  years	  were	  used	  
to	   establish	   the	   remuneration,	   and	   other	   three	  were	   chosen	   to	   set	   the	   quality	  
standards.	   However,	   it	   is	   worth	   to	   mention	   that	   using	   public	   hospitals	   as	  
efficiency	  reference	  may	  not	  have	  been	  the	  most	  correct	  approach,	  since	  private	  
hospitals	  are	  usually	  more	  efficient	  than	  public	  ones.	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  private	  party	  also	  has	  as	  revenues	  user	  fees	  paid	  by	  users	  
in	  its	  entirety	  (that	  are	  nevertheless	  deducted	  from	  the	  remuneration	  paid	  by	  the	  
public	  party),	  the	  share	  borne	  by	  third-­‐party	  payers	  (like	  health	  subsystems	  and	  
insurance),	  and	  third-­‐party	  commercial	  proceeds	  that	  are	  to	  be	  shared	  with	  the	  
public	  party.	  
	  
5.2	  Central	  Scenario	  
The	  valuation	  of	  the	  central	  scenario	  was	  performed	  using	  the	  Discounted	  
Cash	   Flow	   (DCF)	   method,	   by	   calculating	   the	   Net	   Present	   Value	   (NPV)	   of	   the	  
project	  for	  the	  two	  scenarios	  considered.	  
	  
5.2.1	  Scenario	  1	  
As	   previously	   said,	   in	   scenario	   1	   the	   operational	   costs	   follow	   the	   same	  
evolution	  as	  predicted	  in	  the	  Base	  Case	  scenario	  (86,7%	  of	  revenues).	  Moreover,	  
for	  this	  scenario	  there	  are	  two	  sub-­‐scenarios.	  In	  the	  first	  one,	  the	  free	  cash	  flows	  
to	  the	  firm	  are	  discounted	  using	  the	  discount	  rate	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  and,	  in	  the	  
second	   one,	   they	   are	   discounted	   using	   the	   Weighted	   Average	   Cost	   of	   Capital	  
(WACC).	  
The	  table	  below	  shows	  the	  results	  for	  these	  two	  scenarios.	  Under	  this	  first	  
scenario,	   this	  PPP	  presents	  a	  negative	  net	  present	  value	  (which	  means	  that	   the	  
cash	  inflows	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  smaller	  than	  the	  investment	  made,	  and	  thus	  the	  
project	   does	   not	   create	   value	   for	   HPP	   –	   the	   investor).	   Without	   flexibility,	   the	  
hospital	   represents	   a	   loss	   of	   30.372.906	   (using	   the	   PSC’s	   discount	   rate)	   or	  
27.970.710€	  (using	  WACC).	  From	  the	  ratio	  NPV/I	  it	  is	  visible	  that	  the	  project	  is	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expected	   to	   generate	   a	   negative	   return	   of	   -­‐54,64%	   over	   the	   investment	   if	   we	  
consider	  the	  public	  sector’s	  discount	  rate,	  and	  of	  -­‐50,32%	  if	  we	  consider	  WACC.	  
	  





55.583.757	   25.210.851	  	   (30.372.906)	  	   -­‐54,64%	  
WACC	   55.583.757	   27.613.047	  	   (27.970.710)	  	   -­‐50,32%	  
Figure	  5:	  Summarized	  results	  from	  Discounted	  Cash	  Flow	  method.	  I	  stands	  for	  Investment,	  PV	  for	  
Present	  Value	  and	  NPV	  for	  Net	  Present	  Value.	  
	  
5.2.2	  Scenario	  2	  
In	   the	   second	  scenario,	   the	  operational	   costs	   follow	   the	  evolution	  of	   the	  
past	  data,	   after	   a	   slight	   stabilization.	  This	  means	   that	   the	  operational	   costs	   are	  
95%	  of	  the	  revenues.	  As	  well	  as	  in	  scenario	  1,	  two	  sub-­‐scenarios	  were	  built,	  one	  
using	  the	  discount	  rate	  of	  the	  public	  sector,	  and	  another	  using	  the	  WACC.	  
The	  table	  below	  presents	  the	  results	  obtained.	  As	  shown,	   the	  results	  are	  
not	   very	   different	   than	   those	   from	   the	   first	   scenario.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   PPP	  
presents	   an	   even	   more	   negative	   NPV.	   The	   DCF	   results	   show	   that	   without	  
flexibility,	  the	  hospital	  is	  expected	  to	  generate	  huge	  losses	  for	  the	  private	  party.	  
	  





55.583.757	   6.467.222	  	   (49.116.535)	  	   -­‐88,36%	  
WACC	   55.583.757	   6.883.252	  	   (48.700.505)	  	   -­‐87,62%	  
Figure	  6:	  Summarized	  results	  from	  Discounted	  Cash	  Flow	  method.	  I	  stands	  for	  Investment,	  PV	  for	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5.3	  Monte	  Carlo	  Simulation	  
As	  previously	  mentioned,	   the	   only	   relevant	   source	   of	   uncertainty	   arises	  
from	  the	  demand	  risk,	  represented	  by	  the	  volatility	  of	  the	  revenues.	  In	  the	  Monte	  
Carlo	  simulation	  1.000	  possible	  scenarios	  for	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  revenues	  were	  
built,	  based	  on	  the	  following	  assumption:	  	  
A.	   5.	   The	   annual	   changes	   of	   the	   Revenues	   follow	   a	  Normal	   Distribution	  
with	  mean	  0,063	  and	  standard	  deviation	  equal	  to	  0,050.	  
(14)	   ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠~𝑁 0,063; 0,050 	   	  
	   These	  1.000	  scenarios	  for	  the	  revenues	  allowed	  obtaining	  1.000	  different	  
sets	  of	   future	  cash	   flows,	   from	  which	   the	  correspondent	  present	  values	   for	   the	  
project	   were	   computed,	   using	   both	   the	   public	   sector’s	   discount	   rate	   and	   the	  
WACC.	  This	  simulation	  was	  run	  for	  both	  scenarios.	  
	  It	   is	   important	  to	  mention	  that,	  as	  the	  annual	  variations	  in	  the	  revenues	  
are	   assumed	   to	   follow	   a	   Normal	   Distribution,	   the	   different	   present	   values	  
obtained	   from	   the	   simulation	   also	   follow	   such	   distribution.	   With	   the	   present	  
values	   it	   was	   possible	   to	   determine	   the	   random	   variable	  𝑣! = 𝑙𝑛
!!
!!
	  for	   each	  
simulation,	  from	  which	  the	  project	  volatility	  was	  computed.	  	  
	  
5.4	  Binomial	  Lattice	  
The	   last	   step	  was	   the	   estimation	   of	   the	   net	   present	   value	   of	   the	   project	  
using	   the	   Binomial	   Lattice.	   The	   binomial	   tree	   was	   constructed	   using	   annual	  
periods	   and	   the	   standard	   deviation	   estimation	   resulted	   from	   the	   Monte	   Carlo	  
simulation.	  	  
	  
5.4.1	  Scenario	  1	  
In	  the	  following	  table	  we	  can	  see	  the	  results	  obtained	  without	  considering	  
the	   flexibility	   of	   abandoning	   the	   project	   (NPV	   Central	   Scenario)	   and	   the	   NPV	  
obtained	  from	  the	  Binomial	  Lattice	  for	  the	  two	  sub-­‐scenarios:	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Scenarios	   NPV	  Central	  Scenario	   NPV	  Binomial	  Lattice	  
Public	  Sector's	  Discount	  
Rate	  
(30.372.906)	   (30.372.906)	  
WACC	   (27.970.710)	   (27.970.710)	  
Figure	  7:	  Comparison	  between	  Central	  Scenario	  and	  Binomial	  Lattice	  results.	  
	  
As	   shown,	   adding	   the	   flexibility	   to	   abandon	   the	   project	   in	   this	   first	  
scenario	  does	  not	  add	  value	  to	  it.	  The	  value	  of	  the	  option	  is	  0€,	  and	  thus	  the	  NPV	  
from	   the	   Binomial	   Lattice	   is	   the	   same	   as	   from	   the	   Central	   Scenario.	   This	   is	  
explained	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   never	   optimal	   for	   the	   private	   party	   to	   step	   out,	  
since	   stepping	   out	   allows	   for	   lower	   savings	   than	   the	   profit	   they	  would	   obtain	  
from	  continuing.	  
The	   results	   from	   the	   binomial	   lattice	   regarding	   the	   option	   to	   continue	  
versus	  abandoning	   the	  project	  are	  represented	   in	  Figure	  8.	   In	   the	   table	  we	  can	  
see	   that	   it	  will	   always	   be	   optimum	   to	   continue	   regardless	   of	   the	   discount	   rate	  
used.	  	  
	  
Year	   Node	   Decision	  PSC	   Decision	  WACC	  
2017	  
11	   Continue	   Continue	  
12	   Continue	  	   Continue	  	  
13	   Continue	  	   Continue	  	  
14	   Continue	  	   Continue	  	  
15	   Continue	   Continue	  	  
2016	  
7	   Continue	   Continue	  	  
8	   Continue	   Continue	  
9	   Continue	   Continue	  	  
10	   Continue	   Continue	  
2015	  
4	   Continue	  	   Continue	  	  
5	   Continue	  	   Continue	  
6	   Continue	  	   Continue	  
2014	  
2	   Continue	  	   Continue	  
3	   Continue	  	   Continue	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2013	   1	   Continue	   Continue	  
Figure	  8:	  Decision	  to	  abandon	  or	  to	  continue	  per	  node.	  
	  
5.4.2	  Scenario	  2	  
In	  the	  following	  table	  we	  can	  see	  the	  results	  obtained	  without	  considering	  
the	   flexibility	   of	   abandoning	   the	   project	   (NPV	   Central	   Scenario)	   and	   the	   NPV	  
obtained	  from	  the	  Binomial	  Lattice	  for	  the	  two	  sub-­‐scenarios:	  
	  
Scenarios	   NPV	  Central	  Scenario	   NPV	  Binomial	  Lattice	  
Public	  Sector's	  Discount	  
Rate	  
(49.116.535)	   (49.114.963)	  
WACC	   (48.700.505)	   (48.697.957)	  
Figure	  9:	  Comparison	  between	  Central	  Scenario	  and	  Binomial	  Lattice	  results.	  
	  
For	  this	  scenario,	  under	  the	  binomial	  lattice	  model,	  the	  net	  present	  value	  
equals	   a	   loss	   of	   49.114.963€	   when	   the	   PSC	   discount	   rate	   is	   used,	   and	   of	  
48.697.957€	  with	   the	  WACC.	   In	   this	   case,	   we	   see	   that	   the	   result	   confirms	   the	  
evidence	  from	  literature,	  since	  it	  confirms	  that	  the	  DCF	  underestimates	  the	  value	  
of	   the	   project.	   The	   introduction	   of	   uncertainty,	   translated	   here	   as	   flexibility	   to	  
abandon	  the	  project,	  added	  value	  to	  it.	  	  
For	   this	   second	  scenario,	   the	  results	   from	  the	  binomial	   lattice	   regarding	  
the	   option	   to	   continue	   with	   the	   project	   versus	   abandoning	   are	   different	   than	  
those	  from	  the	  previous	  scenario.	  In	  Figure	  10	  we	  can	  see	  that	  in	  2013	  the	  best	  
option	  would	  be	  to	  abandon	  the	  project.	  
	  




11	   Continue	   Continue	  
12	   Continue	  	   Continue	  	  
13	   Continue	  	   Continue	  	  
14	   Continue	  	   Continue	  	  
15	   Abandon	   Abandon	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2016	  
7	   Continue	   Continue	  
8	   Continue	   Continue	  
9	   Continue	   Continue	  
10	   Abandon	   Abandon	  
2015	  
4	   Continue	  	   Continue	  	  
5	   Continue	  	   Continue	  	  
6	   Abandon	   Abandon	  
2014	  
2	   Continue	  	   Continue	  	  
3	   Abandon	  	   Abandon	  	  
2013	   1	   Abandon	   Abandon	  
Figure	  10:	  Decision	  to	  abandon	  or	  to	  continue	  per	  node.	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6.	  Conclusions	  
Hospital	  de	  Cascais	  was	  the	  first	  hospital	  from	  NHS	  to	  be	  concessioned	  and	  
built	  under	  the	  PPP	  program	  in	  Portugal.	  It	  belongs	  to	  the	  first	  group	  of	  PPPs	  in	  
the	   healthcare	   sector,	   which	   includes	   the	   design,	   construction,	   financing,	  
maintenance	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  hospital.	  The	  hospital	  has	  been	  under	  the	  PPP	  
program	  since	  2009,	  moving	  to	  the	  new	  building	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  2010.	  In	  the	  
3	  years	  for	  which	  there	  is	  historical	  data,	  the	  hospital	  has	  shown	  losses	  and	  has	  
been	   deeply	   criticized.	   Such	   criticism	   existed	   even	   before	   the	   hospital	   was	  
operational,	  as	  the	  contract	  was	  failed	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Audit.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  these	  
events,	  the	  present	  study	  aimed	  at	  understanding	  whether	  HPP	  would	  step	  out	  of	  
the	  project	  before	   the	  end	  of	   the	  contract	   in	  2018.	  The	  results	  of	   the	  study	  are	  
the	  following:	  
From	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Discounted	   Cash	   Flow	   method	   to	   the	  
central	   scenario,	  we	  did	   not	   obtain	   very	   different	   values	   for	   the	   two	   scenarios	  
considered.	  In	  scenario	  1,	  using	  the	  operational	  costs	  as	  percentage	  of	  revenues	  
defined	  in	  the	  Base	  Case,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  project	  has	  a	  negative	  net	  present	  value	  
of	  30.372.906€,	  using	  the	  PSC’s	  discount	  rate	  and	  of	  27.970.710€,	  using	  WACC.	  
Such	   values	   yield	   negative	   returns	   of	   -­‐54,64%%	   and	   -­‐50,32%,	   respectively.	  
These	  results	  are	  neither	  unexpected	  nor	  surprising	  if	  we	  take	  into	  account	  the	  
present	  financial	  situation	  of	  the	  hospital,	  which	  has	  been	  reporting	  losses.	  When	  
we	  analyse	  the	  results	  of	  the	  second	  scenario	  built	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  
we	  see	   similar	   results	   to	   those	   from	   the	   first	   scenario.	   In	   this	   case,	  we	  can	   see	  
that	   the	   project	   yields	   a	   negative	   present	   value	   of	   49.116.535€	   when	   PSC	  
discount	  rate	  is	  used,	  and	  of	  48.700.505	  with	  WACC.	  From	  the	  DCF	  analysis,	  we	  
observe	  that	  this	  project	  results	  in	  huge	  losses	  for	  the	  private	  partner,	  regardless	  
of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  operational	  costs.	  
Adding	  the	   flexibility	  of	  stepping	  out	  of	   the	  contract,	   represented	   in	   this	  
paper	  by	  the	  abandonment	  options,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  in	  the	  first	  scenario	  it	  did	  not	  
add	  value	   to	   the	   results	   from	   the	  DCF	  approach.	  The	  value	  of	   the	  hospital	   that	  
results	   from	   this	   approach	   is	   the	   same	   as	   from	   applying	   the	   DCF.	   This	   is	  
explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  stepping	  out	  is	  never	  the	  best	  decision	  for	  HPP.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  in	  the	  second	  scenario	  the	  Real	  Options	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  best	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option	   for	   HPP	   is	   to	   abandon	   in	   2013,	   since	   it	   prevents	   them	   to	   have	   further	  
losses.	  	  
We	   could	   also	   observe	   that	   the	   results	   obtained	   from	   the	   Real	   Options	  
approach	   in	   the	  second	  scenario	  confirm	  the	  evidence	   from	   literature:	   the	  DCF	  
method	  underestimates	  the	  value	  of	  the	  hospital,	  since	  it	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  
value	  that	  flexibility	  creates	  for	  the	  private	  party.	  	  
Furthermore,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  mention	  that,	  although	  stepping	  out	  of	  the	  
project	   is	   optimal	   in	   the	   second	   scenario,	   HPP	   should	   not	   only	   consider	   the	  
financial	  aspects	  of	  this	  decision	  but	  also	  the	  reputational	  issues	  that	  would	  most	  
certainly	   arise.	   It	   is	   reasonable	   to	   think	   that	   if	   a	   company	   is	   having	   financial	  
losses	  and	  has	  the	  flexibility	  to	  step	  out	  and	  leave,	  then	  it	  should	  do	  it.	  However,	  
with	   such	  decision	   come	   reputational	  problems	   that	  may	  affect	  HPP’s	   financial	  
results	   more	   than	   staying	   in	   a	   project	   that	   has	   only	   losses.	   Moreover,	   such	  
problems	  could	  damage	  the	  image	  of	  Amil,	  the	  group	  that	  just	  bough	  HPP	  Saúde	  
in	  March	  and	   for	  whom	  this	  acquisition	   is	   the	  starting	  point	   for	  a	  strategy	   that	  
does	  not	  end	  with	  this	  business.	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7.	  Limitations	  
It	   is	   important	   to	  mention	   that	   there	   are	   some	   limitations	   in	   this	  work	  
that	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  The	  first	  and	  most	  relevant	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  data	  
from	  the	  Base	  Case	  scenario,	  since	  the	  annexes	  of	  the	  contract	  were	  not	  available,	  
and	   thus	   I	   only	   had	   access	   to	   some	  data	   from	   it.	   This	  means	   that	   even	   though	  
there	  was	  a	  Public	  Sector	  Comparator	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  use	  it	  100	  per	  cent	  as	  
a	  benchmark	  in	  this	  study.	  Some	  of	  the	  information	  had	  to	  be	  estimated,	  which	  
may	  have	  caused	  inaccurate	  results.	  	  
Moreover,	   it	   is	  also	  essential	   to	  mention	  that	  the	  uncertainty	  considered	  
in	  this	  paper	  only	  had	  one	  source	  -­‐	  the	  revenues	  -­‐	  and	  consequently	  it	  was	  rather	  
small,	   as	   the	   historical	   data	   available	   for	   the	   revenues	   only	   comprised	   3	   years	  
(2009-­‐2011).	  Such	   led	  to	  a	  very	  small	  statistical	  sample	   for	   the	  computation	  of	  
the	   average	   and	   standard	   deviation	   used	   to	   run	   the	   Monte	   Carlo	   simulation.	  
Therefore,	   the	  volatility	  obtained	  from	  the	  Monte	  Carlo	  simulation	  may	  over	  or	  
under	   valuate	   the	   real	   volatility	   and	   be	   less	   representative.	   Furthermore,	   I	  
believe	   that	   if	   the	   two	   parties	   had	   not	   hedged	   against	   Euribor’s	   volatility,	   the	  
results	   from	  this	  study	  would	  have	  been	  quite	  different.	  This	  belief	  arises	   from	  
the	   fact	   that	   the	   use	   of	   the	   DCF	   model	   to	   value	   projects	   like	   Public-­‐Private	  
Partnerships	  is	  mostly	  criticized	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  discount	  rate	  does	  not	  take	  
into	  account	   the	  volatility	  of	   the	   interest	   rate.	  Thus,	   if	   the	  parties	   involved	  had	  
not	  hedged	  against	  this	  aspect,	  the	  expected	  volatility	  of	  the	  interest	  rate	  would	  
have	  had	  a	  great	  impact	  in	  this	  valuation.	  
	  
8.	  Further	  Work	  
Due	  to	  the	   lack	  of	  historical	  data	   I	  believe	   it	  would	  be	   interesting	  to	  run	  
the	  model	  again	  in	  one	  or	  two	  years	  and	  compare	  the	  results	  of	  the	  two	  runs	  to	  
see	  if	  the	  decisions	  to	  continue	  or	  abandon	  (depending	  on	  the	  scenario)	  are	  still	  
the	  same.	  It	  would	  also	  be	  interesting	  to	  apply	  this	  model	  to	  the	  other	  hospitals	  
built	   under	   the	   PPP	   program,	   such	   as	   Hospital	   de	   Braga,	   as	   it	   has	   also	   been	  
reporting	  financial	  losses.	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7.	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Net	  Costs	  of	  the	  PPPs	  2008-­‐2011	  
Exhibit	  4:	  Net	  Costs	  of	  the	  PPPs	  between	  2008	  and	  2011	  (source:	  Direcção-­‐Geral	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Estimated	  gross	  costs	  with	  current	  PPPs	  
	  
Exhibit	   5:	   Estimated	   gross	   costs	  with	   current	   PPPs	   (source:	   Direcção-­‐Geral	   do	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Exhibit	   8:	   Public	   expenditure	   on	   health	   as	   percentage	   of	   total	   expenditure	   on	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